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INTRODUCTION 
Justifications put forward by the United States government when it uses 
military force abroad are almost never directly confronted in the courts.1 
Separation of powers under the U.S. Constitution has led to significant 
debate throughout the country’s history regarding who has the power to act 
and whether that action can be reviewed by a coordinate branch.2 Since 2014, 
this debate has focused on the power to send U.S. forces into combat against 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).3 Largely academic up to that 
point, the debate was given practical import by the U.S. government’s 
decision to intervene in response to significant gains by ISIL throughout 
Syria and Iraq.4 As the President sought to counter ISIL in both countries, 
he lacked an explicit congressional authorization for the use of military force 
(AUMF) directed at this new group. While President Barack Obama initially 
claimed that his authority under Article II of the Constitution permitted him 
to engage ISIL, his justification later shifted to the 2001 AUMF originally 
drafted for the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and eventually to the 
2002 AUMF for Iraq as well.5 
In general, legal challenges to uses of force fail, either for reasons of 
standing or other justiciability rules,6 but the Supreme Court has 
demonstrated a willingness to address personal liberty issues involved in 
military detention cases.7 This willingness of the courts to intervene when 
 
1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A 
U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED 
FORCE 10 (2011), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/doj-lethal.pdf [https://perma.cc/54MH-AN5U] (“It is 
well-established that ‘[m]atters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely 
proper subjects for judicial intervention’ . . . .” (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981))). 
2 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) (striking down a statute as 
unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers delineated in the U.S. Constitution). 
3 See, e.g., Olivia Gonzalez, The Pen and the Sword: Legal Justifications for the United States’ Engagement 
Against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 133, 159 (2015) (noting the debate 
over whether or not the President had authority to use military force against ISIL). ISIL is also known 
as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 
4 See Liz Sly & Ahmed Ramadan, Insurgents Seize Iraqi City of Mosul as Security Forces Flee, WASH. 
POST (June 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/insurgents-seize-iraqi-city-of-mosul-as-
troops-flee/2014/06/10/21061e87-8fcd-4ed3-bc94-0e309af0a674_story.html?utm_term=.27960af6f993 
[https://perma.cc/AFA5-UN8S] (describing ISIL’s capture of the second largest city in Iraq and its 
broader territorial gains across Iraq and Syria). 
5 See Jack Goldsmith, Obama’s Breathtaking Expansion of a President’s Power to Make War, TIME 
(Sept. 11, 2014), http://time.com/3326689/obama-isis-war-powers-bush/ [https://perma.cc/23LC-JPLD] 
(noting the shift in September 2014 of President Obama’s justification for the war against ISIL). 
6 See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 285 (D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing for standing and 
justiciability a claim challenging the war against ISIL, brought by a U.S. servicemember deployed to 
Kuwait in support of that conflict); Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 125 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding 
that members of Congress did not have standing to challenge the 2011 military operations against Libya). 
7 E.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 604-05 (2004) (plurality opinion) (reaching the merits and 
holding that due process requires opportunity for detainees to challenge their enemy combatant status). 
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personal liberty is at stake in detention cases likely drove the U.S. 
government’s decision to release a suspected ISIL fighter. 
Faced with the prospect of defending in court its contention that the fight 
against ISIL was authorized by either Congress or the President’s inherent 
constitutional authority, the government elected to release an ISIL fighter it 
had been holding in military custody in Iraq.8 In September 2017, an American 
citizen known as John Doe, who had been fighting for ISIL in Syria, was 
turned over to the American military.9 With the support of the ACLU, he 
challenged his detention and filed a habeas petition in the District Court of 
the District of Columbia.10 The government failed in its efforts to have the 
case dismissed on jurisdictional grounds and was blocked by the courts from 
transferring Doe to Saudi Arabia prior to a determination that it was legally 
authorized to detain him. Facing a pending decision by the district court on 
the merits of the habeas petition, the government released Doe in Bahrain.11 
While many factors likely played into this decision by the government, the 
significant risk of defeat in the courts was almost certainly a major one. 
The Non-Detention Act of 1971 (NDA) notes that “[n]o citizen shall be 
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an 
Act of Congress.”12 Therefore, to resolve the habeas petition the courts must 
answer the question of whether or not Congress has authorized the use of 
force against ISIL and, with it, the detention of American citizen combatants. 
If Congress has authorized the fight and the detention, then the President is 
operating at the height of his powers.13 On the other hand, if Congress has 
not authorized the military detention of American citizens in the fight against 
ISIL, the President will lack the authority to do so because Congress already 
spoke and prohibited such an action in the NDA.14 
This Comment explores how the resolution of Doe’s habeas petition 
would have required the courts to address the executive branch’s authority to 
wage war—a question that courts have avoided in the Post–World War II era. 
This Comment will go beyond the positions outlined in the litigation in order 
 
8 Stipulation of Dismissal at 1, Doe v. Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-2069). 
9 Robert Chesney, Doe v. Mattis: The Fact Dispute in the U.S. Citizen Detainee Case, LAWFARE (Feb. 
20, 2018, 2:37 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/doe-v-mattis-fact-dispute-us-citizen-detainee-case 
[https://perma.cc/3UU5-LWUQ]; Jenna Consigli, Prosecuting the Islamic State Fighters Left Behind by 
Wednesday, LAWFARE (Aug. 1, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/prosecuting-islamic-state-
fighters-left-behind [https://perma.cc/295A-ZXTM]. 
10 See Robert Chesney, A Primer on the Legal Dispute in Doe v. Mattis, LAWFARE (Mar. 9, 2018, 
8:13 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/primer-legal-dispute-doe-v-mattis [https://perma.cc/5KTB-
PAC7] (outlining the legal issues at play in Doe v. Mattis). 
11 Stipulation of Dismissal, supra note 8, at 1. 
12 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2018). 
13 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
14 See 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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to establish the basis for the justiciability of this claim in the historical 
context. It will also incorporate recent legal writing and judicial opinions 
trending towards the normalization of foreign policy to apply a standard of 
deference that does not cede the field to the executive branch, though it still 
recognizes judicial tendencies towards deference in ambiguous contexts. In 
doing so, this Comment seeks to address the full scope of the justifications 
put forward for the fight against ISIL and evaluate the likely outcome the 
government would have considered if it had to defend its justification for the 
war against ISIL in court. 
Part I of this Comment will explore the factual background of Doe’s 
capture and the progression of his case15 before going into Part II, which argues 
that the courts would have found this a justiciable question. Part III examines 
potential sources of congressional authority for the war against ISIL, including 
the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs and congressional appropriations. Finally, Part IV 
rejects the executive branch’s claim that it has independent authority to initiate 
hostilities against ISIL; to the degree that the executive does have that power, 
Congress’s passage of the NDA still would have prohibited the indefinite 
detention of Doe. With the government lacking legal justification for the war 
against ISIL and facing the prospect of a judicial decision declaring that fact, 
the government instead chose to release the fighter. 
Finally, this analysis maintains its relevance with the continued captures 
and detention of U.S. citizens by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).16 
Contrary to the experience with John Doe, the U.S government quickly 
 
15 While not the focus of this Comment, the government originally attempted to release Doe 
back into Syria. Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law in Support of His Application for a Preliminary 
Injunction & Response to Respondent’s Supplemental Memorandum at 1, Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195 
(No. 17-2069). Doe opposed this release into a “dangerous and war-torn country,” id., before the issue 
was mooted by his release into Bahrain and the dismissal of his case, Stipulation of Dismissal, supra 
note 8, at 1. An earlier attempt to transfer Doe to Saudi Arabia was denied by the D.C. Circuit pending 
the resolution of Doe’s habeas petition. Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 748-49 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
16 One American is Warren Christopher Clark (nom de guerre: Abu Mohammad al-
Ameriki) of Houston, Texas. 5 Terrorists Have Been Captured Alive By Our Forces, SDF PRESS 
(Jan. 6, 2019), http://sdf-press.com/en/2019/01/5-terrorists-have-been-captured-alive-by-our-
forces/ [https://perma.cc/W7DG-HHTW]. Previous reporting indicated that Warren Clark applied 
to ISIL to become an English teacher for the organization. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MELEAGROU-
HITCHENS, SEAMUS HUGHES & BENNETT CLIFFORD, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. 
PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM, THE TRAVELERS: AMERICAN JIHADISTS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ 57 
(2018), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/TravelersAmTravelersAmericanJihadistsinS.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/589R-EZ6N]. Reporting continues to indicate that among the 2,000 foreign 
fighters currently detained in Syria, a small number are American. See Ryan Browne & Jennifer 
Hansler, US Officials Say More Than 2,000 Suspected Foreign ISIS Fighters Being Held in Syria, CNN 
(Apr. 17, 2019, 4:32 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/17/politics/foreign-isis-fighters-syria/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/3YYN-3326]. Before August 1, the SDF transferred another Texan, Omer Kuzu, to 
U.S. custody. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Texas Man Charged with Conspiring to Provide 
Material Support to ISIS (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/texas-man-charged-conspiring-
provide-material-support-isis [https://perma.cc/44UJ-KAKM]. 
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extradited Warren Christopher Clark and Omer Kuzu and charged them in 
the civilian legal system.17 Meanwhile, other prisoners claiming to be 
Americans, such as Lirim Sulejmani, remain in SDF prisons.18 
The prosecutions of Clark and Kuzu demonstrate that when the U.S. 
government has a clear case, it is willing to quickly act to bring a suspected 
ISIL member into the civilian justice system. But when the situation is more 
complicated, as is likely the case for the remaining American SDF prisoners, 
the legal playing field outlined in this Article will shape U.S. decisionmaking. 
Accordingly, the U.S. government will likely only take custody if the U.S. is 
able to quickly bring charges in civilian courts in order to avoid the possibility 
of litigating its authority to indefinitely detain the ISIL fighter under the 
AUMF or Article II authority. 
I. THE DETENTION OF JOHN DOE 
At some point around September 11, 2017, the SDF detained John Doe, a 
dual U.S.-Saudi national, near ISIL-controlled territory around Dayr az Zur, 
Syria.19 Due to his U.S. citizenship, the SDF transferred him to the U.S. 
military.20 The government alleged that Doe was a member of ISIL and 
contended that he joined the organization in July 2014.21 The government 
alleged that, after joining the organization, he “was an ISIL fighter recruit, 
attended an ISIL training camp, swore loyalty to the ISIL leader, and worked 
for and provided support to ISIL through his work in various capacities for 
two-and-a-half years, until air strikes and other military offensives against 
ISIL forced him to flee,” and he was captured by the SDF.22 The SDF found 
Doe carrying $4,000 in cash, a GPS device, and a thumb drive containing 
ISIL administrative spreadsheets as well as instructions for bomb making, the 
use of various weapons, interrogation techniques, and other “how-to 
 
17 See Indictment at 1-2, United States v. Clark, No. 19-0002 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2019); Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Texas Man Arrested for Attempting to Provide Material Support to a 
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/texas-man-
arrested-attempting-provide-material-support-designated-foreign-terrorist [https://perma.cc/S2CP-
M9P6]. Kuzu was captured by the SDF in March 2019 and a criminal complaint was filed under seal 
in the Northern District of Texas on June 5, 2019. Criminal Complaint ¶ 34, United States v. Kuzu, 
No. 19-0327 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 2019). 
18 Robin Wright, The Dangerous Dregs of ISIS, NEW YORKER (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-dangerous-dregs-of-isis [https://perma.cc/SW4T-
K6Z7]. Fewer than two dozen prisoners are American, and that number includes both fighters and 
family members. Id. 
19 Respondent’s Factual Return at 2, 32, Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195 (No. 17-2069). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 3. 
22 Id. 
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manuals.”23 The U.S. government also found his name listed as a “fighter” in 
a separate ISIL document.24 
Instead of charging Doe with crimes and bringing him back to civilian 
custody as has been done with other terrorism suspects,25 the U.S. military 
detained Doe without access to the courts or an attorney.26 The ACLU 
asserted that his detention was in violation of the NDA, which stated that 
“[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States 
except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”27 The government contended that 
Doe’s detention by the military was permitted under three independent 
authorities: the 2001 AUMF targeting Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the 2002 
AUMF targeting Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq, and the President’s 
inherent powers under Article II of the Constitution.28 
After the ACLU intervened and filed a habeas petition on Doe’s behalf, 
Judge Tanya Chutkan of the D.C. District Court ordered the government to 
give the ACLU access to Doe, and the ACLU received permission from Doe 
to advance his case.29 The government then attempted, but was barred from, 
transferring Doe to Saudi Arabia.30 With the merits of the habeas petition all 
that remained before the district court, the government agreed to release Doe 
in Bahrain.31 This allowed the government to avoid a court ruling on the 
authority of the military to detain Doe and, because the NDA requires an act 
of Congress to authorize the detention of an American citizen, to avoid a 
court ruling on whether Congress has granted the executive the authority to 
wage war against ISIL in Syria and detain American citizens who may take 
up arms in that fight.32 
 
23 Id. at 3-4. 
24 Id. at 4. 
25 See, e.g., Adam Goldman & Eric Schmitt, Benghazi Attacks Suspect is Captured in Libya by U.S. 
Commandos, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/world/africa/benghazi-
attacks-second-suspect-captured.html [https://perma.cc/468U-RZXS] (describing several instances 
where suspected terrorists were captured by the U.S. military and transferred back to the U.S. to face 
criminal charges in civilian courts). 
26 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2-3, Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195 (No. 17-2069) 
[hereinafter Habeas Petition]. 
27 Id. at 7 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2018)). 
28 Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 5. 
29 Doe v. Mattis—Challenge to Detention of American by U.S. Military Abroad, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/cases/doe-v-mattis-challenge-detention-american-us-military-abroad 
[https://perma.cc/8F7E-BHWD] (last updated Oct. 29, 2018). 
30 Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 201, aff ’d, 889 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
31 Stipulation of Dismissal, supra note 8, at 1. 
32 The desire to dodge a ruling on the war against ISIL may also be the reason that the Trump 
Administration has thus far balked at plans to send 600 ISIL fighters detained by the SDF to the prison at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. See Courtney Kube Trump Admin May Send Captured ISIS Fighters to Iraq Prison, 
Guantanamo, NBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/trump-
admin-may-send-captured-isis-fighters-iraq-prison-guantanamo-n905066 [https://perma.cc/2WJ5-Y2RJ]. 
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II. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
In recent decades, the judiciary has generally avoided the question of 
whether the President is authorized to use force in a given situation by citing 
the political question doctrine. The political question doctrine prevents 
judicial review because the doctrine “is primarily a function of the separation 
of powers.”33 This has led to incorrect “sweeping statements to the effect that 
all questions touching foreign relations are political questions.”34 Critics 
argue that the expansive use of the doctrine is misguided and results from the 
doctrine being “a tempting refuge from the adjudication of difficult 
constitutional claims.”35 But in a case like Doe v. Mattis, the courts would have 
been willing to engage on the merits because the historical tradition of the 
courts and recent Supreme Court decisions involving foreign policy, habeas 
petitions, and enemy combatants all drive towards that conclusion.36 
The political question doctrine has been used by courts at all levels. Lower 
courts have used it to avoid questions related to the U.S. invasion of 
Grenada,37 the Vietnam War,38 and most recently the war against ISIL.39 
These cases often note that the political question doctrine “excludes from 
 
Moving those prisoners to long-term U.S. custody would allow the ISIL fighters to challenge their detention 
through habeas petitions. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that the right of habeas 
corpus applies to detainees at Guantanamo Bay); Tess Bridgeman, Joshua Geltzer & Luke Hartig, 
Guantanamo is No Answer—But Here’s What Can Work, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 31, 2018), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/60540/guantanamo-answer-but-heres-work/ [https://perma.cc/EH5F-VH58] 
(describing challenges the Trump Administration would face if it sent detainees to Guantanamo Bay). 
However, the Military Commissions Act of 2009 permits the military prosecution of individuals who engage 
in or support hostilities against U.S. coalition partners, a category that may include the SDF even outside of 
an authorization to fight ISIL. Military Commissions Act of 2009 § 1802, 10 U.S.C. § 948c (2018). This could 
allow the U.S. to bring charges against the detainees unrelated to whether or not military force was authorized 
against ISIL—permitting the government to dodge the question. However, this question is not the focus of 
this Comment, and such an argument may also fail. 
33 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
34 Id. at 211. 
35 Harold Koh, Judicial Constraints: The Courts and War Powers, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES, 121, 122-23 (Gary 
Stern & Morton Halperin eds., 1994) (quoting Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 
1514 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985)). 
36 Standing is often grounds upon which the courts dismiss use of force challenges, as seen in 
Campbell v. Clinton, where the D.C. Circuit ruled that a congressman did not have standing to 
challenge President Clinton’s use of force in the Balkans. See generally 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
However, in Doe v. Mattis, it is clear that Doe faces a harm in being detained by the government and 
will have standing similar to the petitioners in the military detention cases described infra notes 64-
74 and accompanying text. 
37 Gary Stern & Morton Halperin, Introduction, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE 
POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES, supra note 35, at 1, 8 n.7 
(citing Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). 
38 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
39 Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 285 (D.D.C. 2016). 
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judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and 
value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of 
Congress or the confines of the executive branch.”40 
This deference to the executive branch becomes overly expansive in cases 
involving military force, such as Smith v. Obama. In Smith, Judge Colleen 
Kollar-Kotelly noted that “[q]uestions of statutory construction and 
interpretation . . . are committed to the Judiciary,” but nonetheless avoided 
conducting straightforward statutory interpretation.41 Judge Kollar-Kotelly 
questioned the ability of the courts to “second-guess the executive’s application 
of these statutes to specific facts on the ground in an ongoing combat mission 
halfway around the world.”42 She noted that such a task would require the 
courts to determine whether ISIL appropriately falls under the 2001 and 2002 
AUMFs by examining the “nature and extent” of ISIL’s relationship to Al 
Qaeda and whether targeting ISIL is appropriate to defend the U.S. against 
the continuing threat posed by Iraq.43 As a result, she concluded that this 
raised questions of fact that the courts are not equipped to handle.44 
The Smith decision relies too strongly on the political question doctrine.45 
The doctrine focuses on questions of separation of powers and “indeterminate 
legal standards.”46 In examining whether ISIL is a part of Al Qaeda for 
purposes of the AUMF, the courts can use all of their normal factfinding 
tools, such as “interrogatories, depositions, testimony, and all the other means 
of gathering evidence.”47 There is no basis to argue that the Constitution 
requires courts to refrain from decisions regarding questions of law related to 
the use of military force48—in fact, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty 
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”49 It is striking to see Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly conclude that the courts have no role in determining whether 
ISIL is a part of Al Qaeda when the D.C. Circuit has stated that “[w]hether 
the alleged connections between [a] force and Al Qaeda . . . are sufficient to 
render it an ‘associated force’ [is a] legal question[] that we review de novo.”50 
 
40 Id. at 297 (quoting El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 840 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010)). 
41 Id. at 299. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 299-300. 
44 Id. at 300. 
45 See Michael Glennon, Smith v. Obama: The Political Question Doctrine Misapplied, JUST 
SECURITY (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/34803/smith-v-obama-political-question-
doctrine-misapplied/ [https://perma.cc/8GQ3-RQ63]. 
46 Id. (emphasis removed). 
47 Id. 
48 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 147 (1996). 
49 Glennon, supra note 45 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
50 Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return at 21 n.9, Doe v. Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 
3d 195 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-2069) (quoting Khan v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 
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A. Historical Willingness to Adjudicate Questions Surrounding the Use of Force 
From the earliest days of the Republic, the judiciary has felt comfortable 
addressing whether the executive branch is authorized to use military force. 
Legal issues that involved foreign policy were “generally addressed in 
accordance with a traditional, formal structure of constitutionally delegated 
and reserved powers.”51 While political issues could create “complex or 
challenging cases,” the courts did “not refuse to assume jurisdiction even 
though questions of extreme political importance [were] also . . . involved.”52 
At the start of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court decided cases 
relating to whether or not Congress had declared war against France during 
the Quasi-War of 1798–1800 and the extent of the President’s authority under 
an authorization to direct the use of military force.53 The Quasi-War was 
sparked by French harassment of U.S. ships at sea and a demand for a bribe 
by French officials in what became known as the XYZ Affair.54 In Bas v. Tingy, 
the Supreme Court found that declarations of Congress had authorized 
limited hostilities against France even without a declaration of war.55 One of 
the Justices noted that Congress passed legislation in 1799 where it 
[r]aised an army; stopped all intercourse with France; dissolved our treaty; built 
and equipped ships of war; and commissioned private armed ships: enjoining 
the former and authorizing the latter, to defend themselves against armed ships 
of France, to attack them on the high seas, to subdue and take them as prize.56 
The Court comfortably determined that Congress had authorized the 
conflict.57 A year later the Court reaffirmed this willingness to answer the 
question of whether war was authorized in Talbot v. Seeman, and Chief Justice 
John Marshall wrote that “the acts of [Congress] can alone be resorted to as 
our guides in this inquiry,” directing the Court to evaluate whether Congress 
had authorized general or partial hostilities.58 
The Court went even further a few years later in a dispute over the seizure of 
a ship in Little v. Barreme and concluded that the executive had exceeded the 
 
51 Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 1897, 1911 (2015) (internal quotations omitted). 
52 Id. at 1912. 
53 See Louis Fisher, Historical Survey of the War Powers and the Use of Force, in THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES, 
supra note 35, at 11, 14-15. 
54 JOHN FERLING, JOHN ADAMS: A LIFE 342, 352-54 (1996). 
55 HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 81 (1990). 
56 RANDALL WALTON BLAND, THE BLACK ROBE AND THE BALD EAGLE: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1961, at 18 (1999) (quoting Bas 
v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800)). 
57 Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 46. 
58 BLAND, supra note 56, at 18 (quoting Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801)). 
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authority given to it by Congress to conduct the Quasi-War.59 In Little, the Court 
examined whether a Navy commander violated the law in seizing a ship sailing 
from a French port when the laws authorizing the hostilities only permitted the 
seizure of ships sailing to French ports.60 The Court ruled that it did not matter 
that the commander was acting on a presidential order, because the President 
could not act as Commander in Chief without “any special authority.”61 
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court used traditional tools of 
constitutional and statutory interpretation in order to determine whether 
Congress had authorized a conflict and to what extent Congress had authorized 
the Commander in Chief to execute that conflict. The Court did not shy away 
from the fact that its decision would have political consequences, because there 
were clear roles delineated by the Constitution for Congress and the President. 
As many critics of the expansive use of the political question doctrine have 
argued, there are adequate standards available for the courts to determine 
whether war has been authorized.62 Francis Wormuth and Edwin Firmage 
quoted Professor Wormuth’s Vietnam-era scholarship describing the 
distinction as analogous to the distinctions found in Marbury v. Madison: 
There are no standards for going to war, and therefore the war power was 
given to Congress. No suitor may complain because Congress has declared 
war; and the courts may not take an action because Congress has declared 
war . . . . But the standards to determine whether Congress has exercised its 
war power are simple and easy to apply. Similarly, in Marbury v. Madison, 
Chief Justice Marshall said that deciding whom to appoint was a political 
question, but whether an appointment had been made was a justiciable 
question. The legality of [war] is a justiciable question.63 
In a case such as Doe, the question was not whether the war against ISIL 
was justified or wise, but rather whether Congress had exercised its war power. 
With the tools available to navigate questions surrounding the legality of war 
in the constitutional system, the courts have a role to play in this debate. 
B. Modern Assertion of the Traditional Role of the Courts 
Following a detour from this approach for much of the twentieth century 
due to overly broad interpretations of the political question doctrine, the 
 
59 Id. at 20. 
60 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 170 (1804). 
61 BLAND, supra note 56, at 20 (quoting Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177); accord KOH, supra 
note 55, at 82. 
62 FRANCIS WORMUTH & EDWIN FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR 
POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 246 (1989). 
63 Id. (quoting Francis Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 CALIF. L. 
REV. 623, 680-81 (1972)). 
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Supreme Court appears to have once again gained the willingness to apply 
traditional constitutional and statutory interpretation doctrines to questions 
of war powers. This has been especially stark since the beginning of the War 
on Terror as the Court repeatedly limited the President’s wartime powers in 
military detention cases.64 One of the earliest cases in this trend, and the most 
consequential for cases like Doe, was Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.65 
Yaser Esam Hamdi is an American citizen who joined the Taliban and was 
captured while carrying a Kalashnikov rifle on the battlefield in Afghanistan 
by the U.S.-aligned Northern Alliance.66 Once the Northern Alliance learned 
of Hamdi’s citizenship, they turned him over to the United States (just as the 
SDF did with Doe, Clark, and Kuzu), where he was held in military 
detention.67 Hamdi filed a habeas petition challenging the authority of the 
military to hold him and the government argued that because this related to 
military actions, the courts should not be able to second guess the President 
and instead should defer to the political branches.68 The court of appeals 
initially sided with the government, by denying the request for any hearing 
on the issue.69 The Supreme Court rejected this deference to the 
government’s determination and instead ruled that Hamdi was entitled to 
notice and a hearing.70 
The Court pushed even further in ensuing cases, rejecting government 
claims to deference even in cases involving foreign nationals detained by the 
military. Rasul v. Bush gave military detainees in Guantanamo Bay the right 
to judicial review of their detention,71 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld struck down the 
President’s military commission system,72 and Boumediene v. Bush struck 
down a statute that attempted to deny habeas rights to foreign fighters 
detained in Guantanamo Bay.73 In each of these cases, the Supreme Court 
continued to reject the idea that the political question doctrine reserved 
complicated questions of war to the political branches. Even when Congress 
and the President act together in the context of war and military conflict, 
 
64 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1921-24. 
65 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).  
66 AMANDA DIPAOLO, ZONES OF TWILIGHT: WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND 
FEDERAL COURT DECISION MAKING 70 (2009). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 70-71. 
69 Id. at 71. 
70 Id. at 71-72; see Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1922 (describing the Hamdi decision). 
71 542 U.S. 466, 472-73 (2004). 
72 548 U.S. 557, 567-68 (2006) (plurality opinion). President Bush established the military 
commission system without the involvement of Congress in order to create a process for prosecuting 
enemy combatants detained under the 2001 AUMF. Id. 
73 553 U.S. 723, 732-33 (2008); see also Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1922-23 (describing 
the “unexpected and remarkable” series of losses the government experienced in these post-9/11 
Supreme Court cases). 
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Boumediene stands for the proposition that they cannot go beyond the limits 
of the Constitution because “[t]he laws and Constitution are designed to 
survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times.”74 
These military detention cases and the cases from the early 1800s are 
particularly notable because they came at times of heightened concern about 
the security of the country. The Quasi-War cases show that “even during 
America’s infancy, the time of its greatest national insecurity, foreign affairs 
were not treated as exempt from the ordinary constitutional system of checks 
and balances.”75 The military detention cases, meanwhile, demonstrate that 
“[i]n the context of wartime exigency, in which exceptionalist arguments 
should be at their strongest and in which the executive branch relied upon 
those arguments,” the Supreme Court continued to evaluate the merits of the 
cases and find them justiciable.76 Doe v. Mattis certainly involved wartime 
exigency and concern about national security, but it stands out no more than 
Hamdi, which occurred in the wake of the worst terror attack on U.S. soil, or 
the Quasi-War cases, which occurred in the earliest days of the Republic, 
when the nation’s future was still uncertain. 
The current Supreme Court recently broke with the political question 
doctrine “in broad and sweeping terms” in Zivotofsky v. Clinton.77 In Zivotofsky, 
the government argued, and lower courts held, that the political question 
doctrine prevented the courts from adjudicating the case.78 The Supreme 
Court rejected those arguments and abandoned the guidance of Baker v. Carr, 
instead emphasizing “the power—and obligation—of the courts to resolve 
foreign relations cases, even ones that involve difficult separation of powers 
questions.”79 Chief Justice John Roberts wrote: 
The federal courts are not being asked to supplant a foreign policy decision 
of the political branches with the courts’ own unmoored determination of 
what United States policy .	.	. should be. Instead [the petitioner] requests 
that the courts enforce a specific statutory right. To resolve his claim, the 
Judiciary must decide if [his] interpretation of the statute is correct .	.	.	. This 
is a familiar judicial exercise.80 
As a result, based on the history of the Court’s willingness to answer these 
types of questions and the current Court’s demonstrated willingness and 
ability to conduct a “familiar judicial exercise” in evaluating congressional 
 
74 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798. 
75 KOH, supra note 55, at 83. 
76 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1924. 
77 Id. at 1925. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1925-26. 
80 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012). 
2019] Avoiding Legal Scrutiny 103 
authorizations and executive actions, Doe v. Mattis would have been heard on 
the merits so that the court could interpret the AUMFs and determine 
whether the executive had the authority to indefinitely detain Doe.81 Should 
the U.S. government take custody of any of the remaining American SDF 
prisoners without bringing criminal charges, this same analysis will lead 
courts directly to the merits of their inevitable habeas challenges. 
III. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION 
One avenue for justifying the military detention of an American citizen 
accused of joining ISIL is congressional authorization. The Non-Detention 
Act of 1971 states that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained 
by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”82 No law has 
been passed to explicitly authorize the military detention of American 
citizens fighting on behalf of ISIL,83 but an authorization to use military force 
carries an implied authorization to detain enemy combatants pursuant to the 
laws of war.84 The outstanding question, then, is whether Congress has 
authorized the use of military force against ISIL. 
A. The Arguments for and against Doe’s Detention Under the  
2001 AUMF and the 2012 NDAA 
Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress authorized the executive to use 
force against those responsible. The 2001 AUMF against Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban states: 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
 
81 “[U]nder the Constitution, one of the judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, 
and we cannot shirk from this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant 
political overtones.” Koh, supra note 35, at 123 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 
478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)). 
82 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2018). 
83 The Military Commissions Act notably applies only to non-citizens. Military Commissions 
Act of 2009 § 1802, 10 U.S.C. § 948c (2018). The military detention language of the 2012 National 
Defense Authorization Act noted that its provisions shall not “be construed to affect existing law or 
authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens.” National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2012 (2012 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021(e), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011). Since 
Congress has not changed its position on the military detention of U.S. citizens as reflected in the 
Non-Detention Act of 1971, the Non-Detention Act is still binding. The history of the act will be 
further discussed infra Part IV. 
84 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (plurality opinion) (finding the 2001 
AUMF provided authorization for the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants when fighting 
on behalf of Al Qaeda or the Taliban). A more restrictive view was articulated by Justice Scalia and 
asserted that the AUMF did not authorize the military detention of U.S. citizens, but it only gained 
the support of one other Justice. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Stevens, J.). 
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authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States 
by such nations, organizations or persons.85 
This statement was scaled back from an initial request by President 
George W. Bush for an authorization to “deter and pre-empt any future acts 
of terrorism or aggression against the United States without regard to the 
entities involved.”86 In instituting this restriction, Congress refused to 
authorize the use of force against those unconnected to 9/11, even if it meant 
that the President may be restricted in preventing other terrorist attacks.87 
As a result, the focus of the 2001 AUMF is on Al Qaeda and the Taliban. 
In Hamdi, the Court ruled that this authorization contained an implied 
authorization from Congress to detain U.S. citizens if they were captured as 
enemy combatants fighting on behalf of Al Qaeda or the Taliban.88 This is 
because “[t]he capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, 
detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by universal agreement and 
practice, are important incident[s] of war.”89 Accordingly, “detention to 
prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of 
waging war, [so] in permitting the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’ 
Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention . . . .”90 In other 
words, because Congress had authorized the use of force against the Taliban, 
Hamdi could be held for the duration of hostilities.91 
1. Associated Forces 
To justify the military detention of Doe or any other American citizen, 
the government would need to show that ISIL is covered by the 2001 AUMF, 
which was directed at those who “authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”92 While ISIL did not 
exist on September 11, 2001, the government contends that ISIL is covered as 
either a part of Al Qaeda or as an associated force of Al Qaeda.93 Whether or 
not the 2001 AUMF includes implied coverage of associated forces of Al 
 
85 Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 
224, 224 (2001). 
86 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2079 (2005) (internal quotations omitted). 
87 Id. 
88 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517 (plurality opinion). 
89 Id. at 518 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
90 Id. at 519. 
91 Id. at 521. 
92 2001 AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §	2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). 
93 Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 14. 
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Qaeda and the Taliban is a disputed point;94 however, it is an argument that 
the D.C. Circuit has picked up,95 and the government routinely refers to the 
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith article on this topic.96 Yet even when 
taking the approach of the government, the argument still ultimately fails 
because ISIL does not meet the government’s definition of an associated force. 
An associated force fills an analogous role to co-belligerents in a 
traditional war.97 
Terrorist organizations that act as agents of al Qaeda, participate with al 
Qaeda in acts of war against the United States, systematically provide 
military resources to al Qaeda, or serve as fundamental communication links 
in the war against the United States, and perhaps those that systematically 
permit their buildings and safehouses to be used by al Qaeda in the war 
against the United States . . . .98 
can be considered associated forces and covered by the authorities included 
in the 2001 AUMF.99 This interpretation was reaffirmed by the 2012 National 
Defense Authorization Act, where Congress affirmed that the President could 
use “all necessary and appropriate force” against those who conducted the 9/11 
attacks and those who are “a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the 
Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners.”100 
The government has defined an associated force of Al Qaeda or the 
Taliban to be (1) “an organized, armed group that has entered the fight 
alongside al-Qa’ida or the Taliban,” and (2) “the group must be a co-
belligerent with al-Qa’ida or the Taliban in hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners.”101 A 2016 White House report on current use-
 
94 Compare, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2109-10 (arguing that today, Al Qaeda 
operates through a “confederacy of affiliated terrorist organizations around the world that it inspires, 
leads, and supports”), with Rebecca Ingber, Co-Belligerency, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 67, 73 (2017) (“This 
theory . . . rests on flawed doctrinal grounds, both in its application of largely obsolete neutrality 
law principles designed for states to a modern conflict with a non-state terrorist group, and in its 
overstating of the consequences of a neutrality breach under that historic body of law.”). 
95 See Khan v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“We have held that the AUMF grants 
the President authority (inter alia) to detain individuals who are ‘part of forces associated with Al 
Qaeda or the Taliban.’” (quoting Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010))). 
96 E.g., Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 14 (citing Bradley & Goldsmith, supra 
note 86). 
97 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2113. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 2012 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §	1021 (a)–(b), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011). 
101 WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE 
UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 4 
(2016) [hereinafter 2016 WHITE HOUSE REPORT]; Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 15. 
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of-force authorities noted that “a group is not an associated force simply 
because it aligns with al-Qa’ida or the Taliban or embraces their ideology.”102 
The government concluded that ISIL is an associated force of Al Qaeda 
because of ISIL’s history. The government traced the formation of ISIL back to 
Abu Mu’sab al-Zarqawi’s decision to merge his group with Al Qaeda and form Al 
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).103 AQI engaged in attacks against U.S. and coalition forces 
through the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011.104 In 2006, AQI changed its name 
to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and began claiming attacks under that name.105 
When Osama Bin Laden was killed by U.S. forces in 2011, ISI pledged allegiance 
to his successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri.106 In 2013, ISI expanded operations into 
Syria and changed its name to the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, which the 
State Department recognized as ISIL in 2014.107 Accordingly, the government 
argues that “ISIL basically is al-Qaeda in Iraq.”108 
2. Appropriate Deference in Foreign Policy: Curtiss-Wright to Chevron 
Courts evaluating a case involving ISIL detainees therefore must determine 
what deference to give the government’s interpretation of the 2001 AUMF. The 
courts could question whether the AUMF covers associated forces, whether the 
government’s definition of associated forces is appropriate, or whether the 
government has properly applied its definition to the facts. Alternatively, the 
courts could defer entirely to the government’s interpretation. 
Many have argued that great deference should be granted to the executive for 
any delegation related to foreign policy.109 Taken to the extreme, this would mean 
that since Congress delegated the authority to use force against those who 
“planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001,”110 the executive should be free to determine who is an 
associated force of Al Qaeda and use military force accordingly. 
 
102 2016 WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 4-5. 
103 Id. at 5. 
104 Id. at 5-6. 
105 Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 9. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 9-10. 
108 Id. at 10 (quoting Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs on Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence in 
Iraq: A Threat to U.S. Interests, 113th Cong. 6 (2014) (testimony of Brett McGurk, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Iraq and Iran, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State)). 
109 See Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1492, 1546-48 (2004) (summarizing the debate around nondelegation in foreign policy, including 
Justice Rehnquist’s belief that “nondelegation simply does not apply in the field of foreign affairs” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
110 2001 AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). 
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This more expansive interpretation stems from United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp.111 In Curtiss-Wright, the Court held that the normal limitations on 
restrictions against overly broad delegations from Congress to the executive did 
not apply in foreign policy.112 Justice George Sutherland based this decision on 
three parts. First, he argued that sovereignty over foreign affairs was passed 
from the British Crown to the colonial government after the Declaration of 
Independence and accordingly existed outside of the Constitution and could not 
be limited by Article I.113 However, this argument has been rejected by the 
Supreme Court, and conflicts with even a cursory reading of our nation’s history, 
because “[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power 
and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the 
limitations imposed by the Constitution.”114 
Second, Justice Sutherland reasoned that expansive delegations in 
foreign affairs were permitted because “the President is the sole organ of 
the government in its external relations, and its sole representative with 
foreign nations.”115 While this was dicta, the assertion has carried significant 
weight over the years and is still cited by the executive branch.116 Yet this 
ignores the fact that the Founding Fathers divided the powers over foreign 
policy, especially those pertaining to war, between the branches of 
government—the same type of division that gives rise to the nondelegation 
doctrine in the first place.117 
The third element of Justice Sutherland’s opinion was that there was a 
longstanding practice of Congress delegating authority to the President in 
cases of international commerce so that the President could determine 
whether or not to enforce a statute.118 This was a question of trade and 
communication with foreign nations and the ability of Congress to delegate 
decisionmaking, not a question of the President’s “unrestricted judgment” 
with regards to war.119 
Given the constitutional and relevancy concerns with using Curtiss-Wright 
as precedent, the court must then determine what standards should be used. 
As described in Part IV, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer provides an 
 
111 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
112 Id. at 320-22. 
113 WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 62, at 211 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316). 
114 WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 62, at 212 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 
(1957)); accord Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2116 (2015) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The People of the United States had other ideas when they organized our 
government.”). 
115 WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 62, at 212 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319). 
116 Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2089-90. 
117 Id. at 2087-88. 
118 WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 62, at 213-14 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 329). 
119 Id. at 214. 
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appropriate analytical framework for evaluating presidential power in the 
context of congressional action or inaction,120 but the courts must first 
determine what Congress said in the 2001 AUMF. Throughout the twentieth 
century, the Court repeatedly turned to Schechter Poultry121 and the traditional 
nondelegation cases—and not Curtiss-Wright—when evaluating foreign policy 
cases.122 This implies that the courts should not defer entirely to the 
executive’s interpretation of the AUMF and instead the courts should 
interpret the statute more narrowly to avoid any nondelegation doctrine 
problems.123 
Moving away from Curtiss-Wright leaves open the question of what deference 
should be applied in foreign policy. There is significant scholarship discussing 
the appropriate level of deference that the courts should grant to the executive. 
Some argue that there should be no deference and courts should “scrutinize 
executive action closely” when the executive is interpreting law that is made 
partly outside the executive and that limits the exercise of executive power.124 
Others have argued for Chevron-level125 deference even when Congress has not 
delegated authority to the executive branch, reasoning that the executive branch 
is more politically accountable for foreign policy decisions.126 This Comment 
will focus on a style that is more restrictive than Curtiss-Wright, but still 
deferential to the executive branch when the law is unclear. Accordingly, the 
focus will be on Chevron and Skidmore deference and, in doing so, this Comment 
will align with the sentiment of Part II above, which demonstrated that the 
courts already have the tools to handle these types of cases.127 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. established a 
two-step process to evaluating executive branch actions: “the Court first asks 
whether the statute speaks to the precise issue clearly, and if not, the Court 
 
120 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
121 The nondelegation doctrine restricts the delegation from Congress to the President of 
powers explicitly reserved to the legislative branch by the Constitution. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-52 (1935). 
122 WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 62, at 215-18. 
123 See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (“A 
construction of the statute that avoids this kind of open-ended grant [of legislative power] should 
certainly be favored.”). 
124 Derek Jinks & Neal K. Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1234, 
1239 (2007). 
125 See infra notes 127–129 and accompanying text. 
126 Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort 
Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 613-15 (2013) (noting that Congress did not delegate authority to the 
President in the Alien Tort Statute but that some writers have made a “facially appealing argument” 
that Chevron-level deference should apply anyway). 
127 See, e.g., Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1959 (“Normalizing deference . . . involves 
adopting administrative law’s deference doctrines . . . . Under Mead, when an agency has been 
delegated authority and exercises that authority to interpret the statute, and that interpretation has 
the force of law, then the interpretation is eligible for Chevron deference.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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then defers to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute.”128 Where 
a ruling falls outside of Chevron, it can be given Skidmore deference129 due to 
the “specialized experience and broader investigations and information 
available to the agency.”130 While the 2001 AUMF does not include a formal 
delegation of rulemaking or adjudicatory powers, it can be seen to have an 
“indication of a comparable congressional intent.”131 
3. Deferring on the Question of Law, but Lacking Facts to  
Establish that ISIL Is an Associated Force 
The 2001 AUMF does not explicitly define associated forces, or even 
include a mention of the term (although the 2012 NDAA does), but assuming 
that the AUMF has given the executive rulemaking or adjudicatory powers 
would allow the courts to defer to the executive’s definition of the term. Given 
the Court’s willingness to read the 2001 AUMF to include an authority to 
detain American citizens because it is a necessary part of war,132 the Court 
will likely find a similar justification to allow the U.S. to use force against 
those entities that join forces with Al Qaeda against the United States.133 
Such a need to combat all those who may fight alongside Al Qaeda in order 
to defeat Al Qaeda appears to be the type of thing considered a necessary 
part of war. Accordingly, the government’s definition of an associated force 
provides guidance for the courts.134 
The courts must therefore assess the government’s facts to see if there is “a 
rational connection between the evidence and their ultimate conclusion.”135 The 
government must show facts to establish that ISIL is (1) an “organized, armed 
group that has entered the fight alongside al-Qa’ida” and (2) “a co-belligerent 
with al-Qa’ida . . . in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
 
128 Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). 
129 When Congress has not delegated authority, Skidmore v. Swift & Co. stands for the proposition 
that the interpretations of the executive branch can provide “a body of experience and informed judgment 
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
130 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (internal quotations omitted); accord 
Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1959. 
131 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1965 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law 
Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2665-67 (2005)). 
132 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
133 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2110 (“[A] terrorist organization that joins al 
Qaeda in its conflict with the United States, even after September 11, can be viewed as part of the 
‘organization’ against which Congress authorized force.”). 
134 2016 WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 4-5. 
135 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1967 (noting that the courts routinely conduct this 
type of analysis when the government asserts that an entity supports terrorism). 
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partners.”136 The government has laid out a number of strong facts tying ISIL 
to Al Qaeda,137 but it has not adequately addressed all of the relevant facts.138 
The government fails to fully address the split between ISIL and Al 
Qaeda that occurred in 2014. At the same time that ISIL was expanding into 
Syria, Al Qaeda created Jabhat al-Nusra (or the al-Nusra Front) as a separate 
group.139 In 2013, ISIL and Al Qaeda leadership began a dispute over who was 
the official Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria, with ISIL ultimately rejecting Al 
Qaeda leadership’s orders to recognize Jabhat al-Nusra.140 This led to Al 
Qaeda disavowing ISIL and ending their affiliation.141 As the State 
Department testified at the time, “Zawahiri has publicly distanced the AQ 
leadership from ISIL’s unpopular actions against Syria’s Sunni population, 
and it now appears that ISIL is conducting operations in Syria and Iraq 
entirely independent of any counsel or assistance from AQ core 
leadership.”142 
This dispute was not simply a war of words. ISIL and Al Qaeda went to war 
with one another. ISIL was quick to assassinate a senior Al Qaeda operative in 
Syria,143 and hundreds of fighters were killed in fighting between Jabhat al-
Nusra and ISIL.144 As the fighting between the two groups continued, the leader 
of al-Nusra declared “There is no solution between us and them in the 
meantime, or in the foreseeable future . . . . We hope they repent to God and 
return to their senses . . . if not, then there is nothing but fighting between us.”145 
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Internationally, the decision about whether to align with ISIL or Al Qaeda has 
led to fighting, assassinations, and splits between groups.146 
The direct fighting and rivalry for influence both in Syria and in the 
broader jihadist movement makes it impossible to conclude that there is a 
rational connection between the evidence available and the government’s 
conclusion that ISIL is an associated force of Al Qaeda. While ISIL at one 
time did enter the fight alongside Al Qaeda, it cannot be said to be a co-
belligerent of Al Qaeda at least since the start of 2014.147 Returning to the 
Bradley and Goldsmith definition of co-belligerency in the War on Terror, 
ISIL since 2014: has not participated with Al Qaeda in acts of war against the 
U.S.; has not systematically provided resources to al Qaeda, or served as a 
fundamental communications link for Al Qaeda; and has not systematically 
permitted Al Qaeda to use its buildings, safehouses, or territories.148 The 
timing of Doe’s capture mattered because courts that have evaluated the 
associated-force question in the context of detention proceedings have 
focused on whether or not the entity in question was an associated force of 
Al Qaeda or the Taliban at the time an individual was detained.149 Therefore 
in 2017, when Doe was brought into U.S. custody, ISIL could not be 
considered “a co-belligerent with al-Qa’ida . . . in hostilities against the 
United States or its coalition partners.”150 
The government has two primary counterarguments. The first is that by 
failing to treat ISIL as an associated force the courts “would allow an enemy 
force—rather than the President and Congress—to control the scope of the 
2001 AUMF by splintering into rival factions while continuing to prosecute 
the same conflict against the United States.”151 On its face, this is a valid 
concern. We would not want nonstate actors to be able to manipulate an 
authorization to use military force simply by changing their name. But this is 
not simply a name change or a split designed to evade U.S. military action. 
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There is reason to believe that Jabhat al-Nusra’s recent separation from Al 
Qaeda is such a split designed to evade targeting, but it would be easy for the 
government to provide unclassified evidence demonstrating the façade.152 
The Jabhat al-Nusra “split” with Al Qaeda involved no violence, no public 
rivalry for members or power, and was apparently done on good terms. The 
ISIL–Al Qaeda split was the opposite and involved assassinations and intense 
fighting over territory in Syria.153 Based on these examples in Syria alone, the 
U.S. government would be able to provide the courts with sufficient facts to 
demonstrate whether a name change or a split between jihadist groups 
covered under an AUMF is something that has been put on for show or a real 
falling out between entities as they lose co-belligerent status. This is exactly 
the type of factfinding that Article III courts are authorized to do. 
The second counterargument is that ISIL has continued to carry out attacks 
in Syria and terrorist operations around the world.154 The government notes 
that ISIL was heavily involved in fighting in Syria while kidnapping civilians, 
aid workers, and reporters, and has been responsible for large-scale attacks in 
the West and inspiring others to commit attacks in their name.155 ISIL even 
claims to be “the true executor of bin Laden’s legacy.”156 Yet this argument 
ignores the fact that the case against counting ISIL as an associated force of Al 
Qaeda is not that ISIL is a force for good. ISIL is a terrorist organization that 
must be countered. However, as noted earlier, the White House has stated that 
“a group is not an associated force simply because it aligns with al-Qa’ida or the 
Taliban or embraces their ideology. Merely engaging in acts of terrorism or 
merely sympathizing with al-Qa’ida . . . is not enough to bring a group within 
the scope of the 2001 AUMF.”157 ISIL’s claim to the legacy of bin Laden and its 
continued attacks are reason for concern and would serve as prime justification 
for congressional action but are not justification for inclusion as an associated 
force under the 2001 AUMF. 
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Since ISIL should not be considered an associated force, the government 
would not be able to use the 2001 AUMF as a justification for holding Doe.158 
B. The Arguments for and Against Doe’s Detention Under the 2002 Iraq AUMF 
The U.S. government also points to Congress’s authorization for the war 
against Saddam Hussein’s government as justification for the war against 
ISIL. The 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq 
authorized the President to use the military as “he determines to be necessary 
and appropriate in order to . . . defend the national security of the United 
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” and to “enforce all relevant 
United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”159 While 
disputed, this likely also included an implied authorization to use force 
against any immediate threats arising in the aftermath of the invasion of 
Iraq.160 However, the government stretches this authority too far.161 
First, the authority of the 2002 AUMF likely expired early in the morning 
on December 18, 2011. That is when “[t]he last convoy of U.S. soldiers pulled 
out of Iraq . . . ending nearly nine years of war.”162 In the lead up to the final 
withdrawal in December, the President declared the end of the war in Iraq163 
and turned over all detainees in U.S. military custody to the Iraqi 
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government.164 There was no longer a threat posed by Iraq, and any inherent 
authority to deal with postinvasion disorder ended when U.S. forces 
withdrew from the country. The last U.N. Security Council Resolution 
expired in 2008.165 Even as the U.S. began the fight against ISIL in the 
summer of 2014, the National Security Advisor wrote that the “Iraq AUMF 
is no longer used for any U.S. government activities” and in the fall of 2014, 
the President stated, “[w]ith respect to Iraq, there was a very specific AUMF. 
We now have a different enemy.”166 No justification remained to employ the 
2002 AUMF in Iraq. 
To the degree that the 2002 AUMF remains in force, the government’s 
arguments in the Doe v. Mattis litigation and its 2018 Report on the Legal and 
Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States’ Use of Military Force and Related 
National Security Operations fail to show that the 2002 AUMF applies to 
ISIL.167 The government argues that the 2002 AUMF authorizes the use of 
force against ISIL to the extent it is “necessary to counter the threat that ISIL 
poses to a stable, democratic Iraq.”168 Yet the text of the 2002 AUMF is clear 
and this analysis would not proceed beyond the first step of Chevron 
deference. The 2002 AUMF authorizes the use of force to deal with the threat 
posed by Iraq, not to Iraq.169 ISIL posed a threat to Iraq, especially at the 
height of its power in 2014, but this threat is not being posed by Iraq. 
Alternatively, there have been limited arguments that because former 
members of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist government joined ISIL as it gained 
momentum in Iraq, their membership in ISIL provides a sufficient link to the 
2002 AUMF.170 However, members of one organization who have ties to an 
AUMF-targeted group do not automatically make their new group fall under 
the AUMF. Despite the Al Qaeda ties of prominent leaders of Al Shabaab in 
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Somalia, Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson intervened in 
2010 to stop a military strike on Al Shabaab because he concluded they were 
not an associated force of Al Qaeda.171 State Department Legal Advisor 
Harold Koh came to the same conclusion, arguing that targeting non-Al 
Qaeda affiliated members of Al Shabaab would be unlawful even though the 
leadership of one of the largest factions within the organization had declared 
allegiance to Al Qaeda and had “transnational ambitions.”172 The former 
Ba’athists in Iraq may have once belonged to Saddam’s government or 
military, but they have now joined a completely separate organization, with 
separate aims. Linking ISIL to the Ba’athist regime would stretch the 2002 
AUMF to such an extent that the government does not make this argument 
in either the 2016 or 2018 White House reports or in litigation. 
Accordingly, the 2002 AUMF does not provide authorization to use 
military force against ISIL, and the government would not have been able to 
keep Doe in military detention pursuant to that authority. 
C. Authorization by Appropriation 
The government also pointed to a string of appropriations related to the 
fight against ISIL as proof that Congress has authorized the fight in Iraq and 
Syria.173 The first of these is the Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2015, which granted $5.6 billion for counter-ISIL 
operations.174 The government also highlighted the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2016, where the Explanatory Statement noted the threat 
posed by ISIL and the movement of funds to enable the military to conduct 
counter-ISIL operations, and the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2016, which noted that “defeating ISIL is critical to maintaining a 
unified Iraq.”175 Yet none of these indicate an authorization comparable to war 
against ISIL or declare that the 2001 or 2002 AUMF applies to this fight. 
The 2015 appropriations act appears to have incorporated much of the funding 
into the general Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding line, which 
covers a broad range of overseas operations—not just the fight against ISIL.176 
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Approximately $1.6 billion was appropriated directly for use against ISIL but only 
in the context of the Iraq Train and Equip program, allowing the U.S. military to 
train and equip vetted groups in the fight against ISIL.177 
The 2016 appropriations bill continues the provision of funds for the 
Train and Equip program,178 and allows for the reimbursement of expenses 
for coalition allies in the fight against ISIL and in Afghanistan.179 The 
Explanatory Statement cited by the 2016 White House Report mentions the 
rise of ISIL in conjunction with attacks in Paris, destabilizing actions by Iran, 
and Russian aggression in Ukraine as reasons to ensure that the military and 
Intelligence Community have the funding they need to anticipate threats.180 
The statement notes that funding is being moved into the OCO funding 
stream for operations in Afghanistan, increased theater security missions, and 
to maintain a global presence, as well as for counter-ISIL operations; but it 
does not define what those counter-ISIL operations are.181 The 
appropriations bill itself only funds the Train and Equip program, making it 
an inappropriate basis on which the Administration should ground its 
authority for a broader conflict.182 
Finally, in the 2016 NDAA, while Congress does express concern about 
ISIL and highlights the importance of its defeat, the Act only states that the 
U.S. should provide a mission, defense articles, defense services, and related 
training to the government of Iraq and allied entities in the fight against 
ISIL.183 The most explicit authorization for U.S. action against ISIL comes 
from the 2015 NDAA, which authorizes the Secretary of Defense to “provide 
assistance, including training, equipment, logistics support, supplies, and 
services, stipends, facility and infrastructure repair and renovation, and 
sustainment, to military and other security forces of or associated with the 
Government of Iraq, including Kurdish and tribal security forces or other 
local security forces” in order to defend Iraq against ISIL.184 
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None of these is an explicit authorization to use force against ISIL that would 
lead one to understand that it came with an unmistakable authorization for 
detention as an incident of war.185 The Supreme Court has emphasized the 
importance of being explicit when authorizing via appropriations.186 In Ex parte 
Endo, the Court stated that when attempting to authorize through appropriation, 
“the appropriation must plainly show a purpose to bestow the precise authority 
which is claimed,” and Congress cannot do that if a lump sum appropriation is 
made to an “overall program of the Authority and no sums were earmarked for 
the single phase of the total program” in question.187 This need for explicit 
wording is especially important in areas of “doubtful constitutionality” because 
such an authorization “requires careful and purposeful consideration by those 
responsible for enacting and implementing our laws.”188 By appropriating funds 
to the general OCO account, the appropriations cannot show a specific purpose. 
It does not matter that Congress authorized and appropriated funds for 
the Train and Equip program to counter ISIL. That cannot be taken as a 
broader authorization for military force. The Constitution delegated to 
Congress the ability to use a sliding scale for how much force can be 
authorized—from war to letters of marque and reprisal.189 Just as the 
President could not authorize the seizure of ships sailing from French ports 
when Congress had only authorized the seizure of ships sailing to French 
ports,190 the President cannot authorize combat operations against ISIL when 
Congress has only authorized the Train and Equip program. 
Given that Congress has not authorized the use of force against ISIL 
through appropriations and has not authorized the fight against ISIL through 
the 2001 or 2002 AUMFs, there was no act of Congress providing authority 
for the military to detain Doe outside of the judicial process. To do so would 
be a violation of the Non-Detention Act.191 The government will similarly be 
confined to the traditional judicial process if it gains custody of any of the 
remaining American SDF prisoners. 
IV. ARTICLE II AUTHORITY 
Lacking congressional authority, the government also made an appeal to 
the powers inherent under Article II of the Constitution that are afforded to 
the President as Commander in Chief. The government contends that 
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because it has the independent authority to deploy military forces around the 
world, the President can detain combatants for as long as U.S. forces are 
engaged on a given battlefield.192 Specifically, the government points to 
historical practice, noting that the executive has used military force 
repeatedly without congressional approval in recent decades—most recently 
in Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2017.193 Because U.S. forces were fighting against 
ISIL in Syria, the government argued that the U.S. military could detain Doe 
as a “fundamental incident of waging war” until hostilities ended, U.S. forces 
left the theater of operations, or the military was able to arrange a release of 
Doe in a way that did not endanger U.S. forces.194 
This expansive interpretation of executive power undermines the clear 
writing of the Constitution and the intentions of the Founding Fathers. In 
his famous Youngstown concurrence, Justice Robert Jackson warned against 
expansive claims of “inherent” presidential power since the Founders “knew 
what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative 
action, [and] knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation.”195 
Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war and to 
issue letters of marque and reprisals.196 “There is little evidence that . . . the 
Framers intended more than to establish in the Presidency civilian command 
of the armed forces during wars declared by Congress . . . .”197 This is because 
the Framers wanted to move away from the powers held by the British king 
and his ability to declare and direct war.198 The Framers were intentional in 
their use of separation of powers throughout the Constitution in order to let 
each branch check the judgment of the others.199 By incorporating this 
separation of powers in foreign policy with regards to the power to declare 
war, the Framers sought to break the link they saw between war power and 
“executive (monarchical) authority.”200 James Wilson captured this desire 
when he noted that this system of separation of powers in foreign affairs 
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would “guard against” hurrying into war because “[i]t will not be in the power 
of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for 
the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large.”201 
The Founding Fathers did not view the Declare War Clause in a narrow 
technical, international law sense, but instead viewed it expansively as 
authorizing the nation to enter into hostilities of varying intensities.202 Each 
of the first three American presidents sought authorization from Congress 
for actions less than full scale war: 
George Washington emphasized that he did not have independent power to 
use military force against hostile tribes on the Western frontier. President 
John Adams did not dispute that the quasi-war with France needed 
Congress’s approval . . . . President Thomas Jefferson acknowledged that 
Congress’s approval was required to go beyond defensive measures with 
regard to Tripoli.203 
This consistent interpretation provides guidance on when the President can 
use force abroad. 
This does not mean that the President must get congressional 
authorization for every use of military force. The President also maintains 
the ability to respond to direct threats to the country. The Founders clearly 
intended for the President to have the ability to repel attacks against the 
U.S.204 and “it is plausible that limited military operations to rescue or protect 
U.S. citizens abroad, so long as the operations do not involve material 
challenges to or material engagement with the territorial sovereign, would 
not amount to initiation of war.”205 This understanding would allow the 
President to conduct rescue operations for Americans held hostage, conduct 
noncombatant evacuation operations of American civilians trapped in combat 
zones, and intervene to disrupt a terrorist plot against the United States. But 
this would not extend to committing U.S. forces to long-term combat 
engagements overseas without congressional approval. 
The argument from practice holds that this history and the clear text of 
the Constitution is not the final arbiter. Instead, when the President uses 
force abroad without congressional approval, he creates precedents that 
expand his scope of legal authority for independent actions.206 This is due to 
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the historic gloss that practice places on the Constitution when “systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress 
and never before questioned . . . mak[es] as it were such exercise of power 
part of the structure of our government.”207 Curtis Bradley and Jean Galbraith 
note the use of these executive actions as precedents by the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) to create a framework that OLC uses to justify further 
executive action.208 For example, in justifying the use of force against Libya 
in 2011, OLC stated that “the President has the power to commit United 
States troops abroad, as well as to take military action, for the purpose of 
protecting important national interests, even without specific prior 
authorization from Congress.”209 In doing so, OLC pointed to the use of force 
in Libya (1986), Panama (1989), Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1993–1995), Haiti 
(1994, 2005), and Yugoslavia (1999), which all occurred without congressional 
authorization, as indicating the right of the executive to utilize a broad 
constitutional power in using force.210 Additionally, the Supreme Court has 
noted that “[i]n separation-of-powers cases this Court has often ‘put 
significant weight upon historical practice.’”211 
Yet there are reasons to doubt that this gloss is fully appropriate in this 
context. First, it is not clear that unilateral presidential use of force is a 
“systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of 
the Congress and never before questioned” to the degree that its supporters 
portray it.212 Most of the military actions taken since Vietnam have been done 
either with congressional approval, to rescue U.S. citizens, or to respond to 
an attack on U.S. forces or facilities, eliminating their relevance in 
demonstrating a more expansive Article II power under historical gloss.213 
And Congress has not been silent when the executive has acted outside of 
these limited circumstances.214 In 2011, Congress rejected an authorization to 
use force against Libya by a vote of 123–295.215 Congress also rejected a 
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resolution to authorize the use of force in Kosovo in 1999.216 Requiring 
Congress to overturn the executive use of force by passing a resolution 
explicitly denying authorization or denying funding would turn the 
constitutional requirement on its head—mandating a 2/3 vote in each 
chamber of Congress to stop a war initiated unilaterally by the President.217 
Instead, when the President acts, it must be based on a grant of power from 
the Constitution—“one cannot derive an ought from an is.”218 The traditional 
arguments for applying a historical gloss on constitutional interpretation and 
applying a doctrine related to congressional acquiescence do “not accurately 
reflect the dynamics of modern congressional–executive relations” and are “an 
especially inapt description of congressional behavior.”219 As Justice Jackson 
noted in Youngstown, “[p]arty loyalties and interests, sometimes more binding 
than law, extend [the President’s] effective control into branches of government 
other than his own and he often may win, as a political leader, what he cannot 
command under the Constitution.”220 Thus, what the President may be able to 
achieve politically does not provide adequate justification for turning the 
constitutional order upside down. 
Yet even if the President were to have Article II authority to use force 
against ISIL, either to protect U.S. forces in Iraq and the Middle East or to 
prevent attacks against the United States and its citizens, the President still 
lacked authority to keep Doe in military detention indefinitely. Justice 
Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown sets out a framework by which the courts 
regularly evaluate separations of powers cases.221 When the President acts 
with congressional authorization, his authority is at its maximum; when the 
President acts in the absence of any indication from Congress, he is in a “zone 
of twilight” in which the authority to act beyond the President’s own Article 
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II powers is unclear, but may depend on the “imperatives of events”; and 
when the President acts in opposition to the will of Congress, his power is at 
its lowest and he can only act within his own Article II powers minus any 
powers Congress has over the issue.222 
In the present case, Congress has acted and restricted the President’s 
authority by passing the War Powers Resolution and the NDA.223 The War 
Powers Resolution requires the President to terminate the use of the U.S. 
military abroad “unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a 
specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has 
extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a 
result of an armed attack upon the United States.”224 As detailed in Part III, 
Congress has not provided specific authorization for the fight against ISIL, 
and there has been no extension or attack preventing Congress from meeting. 
With well over 60 days running since the commencement of operations against 
ISIL in 2014, even if the President had initial authority to combat ISIS, the 
President has long been in Youngstown category III when considering the 
ongoing operations against ISIL. To whatever degree Article II proponents 
dismiss the earlier arguments in this Part, the War Powers Resolution is a clear 
action by Congress to restrict executive overreach. Without authority to wage 
the war against ISIL, the President will also lack the incidental authorities that 
could come with it, such as the detention of prisoners. 
Meanwhile, the NDA restricts the President’s ability to detain Americans 
such as Doe indefinitely. The government contends that the NDA only applies 
to civilian prisons and civilian detentions and does not apply to the military 
because it falls under the criminal code and replaced a broad civilian detention 
authority.225 This conflicts with the history of the statute. While it was passed 
in order to replace a broader civilian detention authority, it was also passed with 
the intent to prevent military detentions like those imposed against American 
citizens of Japanese descent during World War II.226 This linkage to military 
detentions makes it clear that Congress sought to provide protections for any 
citizen facing detention, not just those facing civilian detention.227 Given the 
restriction in the NDA on the President’s authority to detain, the indefinite 
military detention of Doe occurs under the third category of Justice Jackson’s 
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Youngstown framework. With the President at his lowest level of authority, his 
Article II powers cannot override the restrictions of the NDA, meaning that he 
cannot detain Doe without an act of Congress.228 
With the President lacking authority to use military force against ISIL 
either through Congress or his own Article II powers, the indefinite detention 
of a U.S. citizen is not permissible. 
CONCLUSION 
Without legal authorization for war against ISIL under either 
congressional action or inherent Article II authority, the government faced 
significant risk of defeat in litigation over Doe’s habeas petition. The prospect 
of releasing someone while so much evidence pointed towards him being a 
member of ISIL is disconcerting.229 Given his training and knowledge, it is 
likely that most Americans would not want him walking free. However, the 
government likely did not want to risk a setback for its war powers and 
instead chose to set Doe free. The United States reached this point because 
of a failure of the legislative and executive branches. Instead of holding Doe 
in military detention in Iraq, away from the battlefield in Syria, the 
government could have transferred him back to the United States for a trial 
under federal criminal law. The U.S. court system has a successful track 
record prosecuting those who provide material support to a terrorist 
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organization and is more than competent to handle the case of a U.S. citizen 
accused of supporting ISIL, as is now underway in the cases of Clark and 
Kuzu.230 Alternatively, Congress could have authorized the use of military 
force against ISIL, which would have carried the authority to detain enemy 
combatants along with it.231 When it stormed into the international scene in 
2014, ISIL posed a serious and dire threat to the government of Iraq. ISIL 
also demonstrated a willingness to kill civilians en masse, threaten Americans, 
inspire attacks against the U.S., and support attacks against U.S.-allied 
nations in Europe. Congress could have made an argument to the American 
public that this was a threat that needed to be countered and voted on an 
ISIL-focused AUMF. But Congress failed to act. 
The courts should not wade into this debate in order to voice their 
thoughts about the policy of fighting ISIL, but they must not shy away from 
adjudicating the legality of the fight in order to determine whether American 
citizens can be held without trial. 
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